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Social Networks and Labour 
Market Outcomes: 
The Non-Monetary Benefits 
of Social Capital
Axel Franzen and Dominik Hangartner
We contrast Granovetter’s hypothesis (Granovetter, M. (1973). American Journal of Sociol-
ogy, 78, 1360–1380; Granovetter, M. (1974). Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and 
Careers. University of Chicago Press; Granovetter, M. (1995). Getting a Job: A Study of Con-
tacts and Careers. University of Chicago Press) that social networks help individuals to find 
better-paid jobs with a new model, which predicts that networks are helpful with respect 
to non-pecuniary job characteristics but not concerning the monetary pay-offs. Following 
Montgomery (Montgomery, J. D. (1992) American Sociological Review, 57, 586–596), our 
model is a combination of classical job-search theory and the network hypothesis. First, 
concerning the monetary consequences, we test our hypotheses empirically by analysing 
the 2001 International Social Survey Programme on social relations and support systems. 
We show that using social ties is a common job-search strategy in all countries. However, 
using social networks does not increase the monetary pay-off. Second, we use a sample of 
8,000 Swiss university graduates who recently entered the labour market to show that 
informal job-search channels are beneficial with respect to important non-monetary job 
characteristics. Thus, graduates who received their jobs through social contacts tended to 
get jobs that are linked to their educational degree and offer better career perspectives. 
Furthermore, using personal networks is related to lower search costs. Therefore, the 
results suggest overall that networks improve the non-pecuniary characteristics but not the 
monetary pay-offs.
Introduction
Since Granovetter’s (1974) Getting a Job, the question of
how individuals find jobs and what effect social contacts
have on the labour market has emerged to be one of the
most interesting and controversial research questions in
labour market research. Granovetter’s (1973, 1974)
central ideas can be summarized as three hypotheses.
First, he proposed that many employees find their jobs
through social contacts and not only through formal
channels such as direct applications, employment
agencies, or job advertisements. Second, according to
Granovetter, the use of social networks allows job seek-
ers to gather better information about the availability
of jobs as well as job characteristics. This informational
advantage should enable job seekers to select better
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jobs. Hence a job found through the network should
result in a better match, that is, higher wages and
higher job satisfaction. Third, information about the
labour market can best be generated through weak ties.
The advantage of weak ties as opposed to strong ties
lies in the fact that the information in close-friendship
circles is rather redundant and similar and that more
new information is generated by networks whose
members are dispersed and dissimilar.
Granovetter’s first proposition has been confirmed in
many studies. Most empirical research shows that a sub-
stantial proportion of individuals find their jobs via their
contacts with friends, relatives, colleagues, or acquaint-
ances. However, hypotheses two and three are contro-
versial. Extensive reviews by Granovetter (1995) himself
as well as others (Lin, 1999) suggest that most empirical
studies were not able to confirm the wage bonus. This
conclusion is nurtured by recent results presented by
Mouw (2003) who concludes that contacts have no
causal effect on labour market outcomes.
These results raise the question whether the social
embeddedness of individuals has any consequences at all
on labour market outcomes. We argue that they have
consequences and will present theoretical arguments as
well as empirical evidence, which support the notion
that contacts matter. Jobs found through social contacts
have non-monetary benefits, particularly a better match
between employees’ education and the job require-
ments. Furthermore, social networks reduce the search
costs of finding jobs.
The remainder of the article is organized into four
sections. Are Granovetter’s Hypotheses Refuted? starts
with a brief review of existing findings, namely that most
studies show that networks do not matter with respect to
earnings. We then refer to job-search theory and to
Montgomery (1992) in order to explain these non-
findings. Moreover, we formulate an extension of his
model and propose that job offers obtained through
social networks are superior with respect to non-monetary
characteristics. The ISSP 2001 describes our first data
source and the results obtained. We analyse the ISSP
2001 data and show that jobs found through social con-
tacts are not superior with respect to payment. In The
Swiss Graduate Survey, we refer to another data source, a
survey of university graduates who entered the labour
market in 2001 to show that search strategies are related
to the non-monetary job characteristics. In particular,
we evaluate the outcomes of different job-search strate-
gies with respect to earnings, educational adequacy, and
search costs. Finally, the last section concludes and dis-
cusses our findings and shortcomings.
Are Granovetter’s Hypotheses 
Refuted?
Granovetter’s (1974) original study is based on a sam-
ple of 282 professionals, technical, and managerial
workers1 living in Newton, Massachusetts, who were
interviewed by him and partly surveyed by written
questionnaires in 1969. Fifty-six per cent reported that
they found their jobs through social contacts. This res-
ult has been reconfirmed repeatedly in many studies in
the United States (U.S. Department of Labor, 1975;
Corcoran et al., 1980; Marsden and Campbell, 1990;
Staiger, 1990) as well as in Great Britain, Japan, and
The Netherlands (see Afterword in Granovetter, 1995).
Some differences between studies appear from the fact
that sometimes only active job seekers are taken into
account. However, there is evidence that social con-
tacts also play an important part in those matches in
which respondents received an offer from an employer
without prior search. These respondents are often
excluded from the analyses, a procedure that results in
some biases as Granovetter convincingly argues. Stud-
ies that also pay attention to the ‘non-seekers’ show
that in about 80 per cent of these cases, a friend or rela-
tive was involved. Hence, Granovetter’s proposal that
networks are involved in about half of all job matches
seems to be beyond doubt.
Granovetter’s second and third hypotheses, that jobs
found through social contacts are better paid and more
satisfying for employees and that weak ties are better
than strong ties, are very controversial. Granovetter
(1974) found that 54 per cent of those who found their
jobs through contacts reported to be very satisfied with
their work compared to 30 per cent who found their
work through formal methods. Similarly, a larger pro-
portion (ten percentage points) of the former is found in
the higher income group. However, these findings were
only replicated by a few studies (Corcoran et al., 1980;
Staiger, 1990; Wegener 1991; Coverdill, 1994; Jann,
2003), while many others could not detect a wage differ-
ential (Lin et al., 1981; Bridges and Villemez, 1986;
Marsden and Hurlbert, 1988; Preisendörfer and Voss,
1988; Lin, 1999; Mau and Kopischke, 2001). Some stud-
ies (De Graaf and Flap, 1988; Flap and Boxmann, 2001)
even find a negative wage effect for social contacts. Fur-
ther evidence against Granovetter’s hypothesis has also
been presented recently by Lin (1999), and Mouw (2003)
who concludes ‘I believe the weight of anecdotal evidence
und intuition suggests that being “well connected” is
an advantage in the labor market (...). At the moment,
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intuition und anecdote aside, we have little empirical
evidence that contacts matter’.
However, this conclusion holds only with respect to
the direct effect, that is, for wages of those jobs that were
offered with the help of the social network. The litera-
ture on social resources (see Lin, 1999) also demon-
strated that individuals in high job positions are found
to have a large social network as well. Hence, the two
findings that on the one hand high levels of social capital
are correlated with high-income jobs, but that using the
network on the other hand does not affect the wage level
constitute a paradox. Mouw (2003) suspects that high
job positions and size (and quality) of social networks
are merely associated and that both depend on unob-
served individual characteristics. Hence, he speaks of
spurious social capital. However, an alternative interpre-
tation is given by Montgomery (1992) who offers an
interesting combination of economic job-search theory
and Granovetter’s network hypothesis.
The difficulty of choosing a job is that job offers do
not arrive simultaneously but sequentially in time (e. g.
Lippman and McCall, 1976). Thus, a job seeker is con-
fronted with the following decision problem: either to
accept an offer and stop searching or to reject the offer
and continue searching. Since searching is costly (direct
costs and opportunity costs), a worker who maximizes
lifetime earnings will accept an offer of wage wR (or
higher) if this offer exceeds his value of leisure and if he
does not expect to find a higher wage offer that compen-
sates for the continued search costs (see Mortensen,
1986). wR is called the reservation wage. Obviously, the
higher an individual’s reservation wage the longer his or
her search time until he or she finds a wage offer that
matches the reservation wage. Moreover, the reservation
wage depends (among other things) on the arrival rate of
job offers. The more offers an individual expects the
higher is his or her reservation wage and the higher the
probability of finding a better-paid job. Following Mont-
gomery (1992), one way to interpret the effect of social
capital on wages is via the reservation wage. Individuals
with larger networks (or alternatively a higher propor-
tion of weak ties) may expect to receive more job offers,
which increases the reservation wage. This indirect effect
of social networks on earnings is in line with empirical
findings reported by Lin (1999) and Mouw (2003).2
Networks not only can affect the reservation wage but
can also have direct implication via the job-search strat-
egies. This is Granovetter’s crucial hypothesis who does
not consider the indirect effect via reservation wages.
Montgomery (1992) interprets Granovetter in the way
that weak ties elicit more job offers than strong ties and
shows that the expected wage from weak-tie offers may
be, counter-intuitively, lower than the wage expected
from strong-tie offers. We extend Montgomery’s argu-
ment by applying them to the difference between formal
and informal search channels instead of the difference
between weak and strong ties. First, we assume that most
individuals use both formal (direct applications, answer-
ing job advertisements, placing an advertisement, using
a labour office) and informal (social contacts) search
channels. Second, we assume that the wage distributions
of both channels are identical. Thus, at least in principle,
most available jobs can be found by various search chan-
nels and are not exclusively restricted to one specific
search method. Third, we assume that the offer rate of
informal channels is higher than the one from formal
search methods. This assumption basically follows
Granovetter who asserts that information about new job
opportunities is particularly efficiently (fast) transported
through network ties as compared with formal search
modes. In order to receive a formal offer, a job seeker
first has to find a job advertisement and has to issue a
formal application. This procedure takes more effort
and is more costly than receiving the information from a
network tie and applying with the help of the tie. Thus,
we assume that almost every person receives one or
more offers through the social network channel and only
fewer offers through the formal channel. The problem
now is that most of the time the number and quality of
job offers are unobserved. Instead what researchers (and
we) observe is only the accepted job and the search
channel through which it was found. Thus, it could be
the case that an individual who accepted an offer
received through the formal channel passed on other
offers from the social network. Hence, we infer that a
seeker who accepted a formal offer had on average more
offers to choose from and was therefore better able to
select the best offer. Those who accepted an offer from
the social network are on average likely to have had
fewer offers to choose from, which results in a lower
expected wage.
Wages are of course not the only characteristics of
jobs. This notion is well known and accepted by many
researchers. Particularly, we assume that in addition to
wages, workers consider how well they fit into a job in
terms of their interests and qualifications. One indicator
concerning the quality of the match is how well a
worker’s education and qualifications fit the require-
ments of the job. Let us call this the educational ade-
quacy (a) of a job. We propose that among the jobs
offered that are above the reservation wage, workers
choose the one that best meets their qualifications.
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While we assume that the wage distributions of the
formal and the informal offer distributions are identical,
the job adequacy distributions of both search channels
are not. Our fourth and new assumption is that the ade-
quacy distribution of jobs offered through social net-
works should be stochastically superior concerning the
first and third moment of the distribution (see Figure 1).
More specifically, jobs from the formal offer distribution
might be right skewed with respect to adequacy, because
on average more jobs have low than high adequacy. How-
ever, the offer distribution from the social network should
be skewed to the left side, since networks offer more ade-
quate than inadequate jobs. The rationale behind this
proposition is that the network is rather well informed
about the job seekers’ interest and qualifications and
selects jobs with higher adequacy. Alternatively, it could
be argued that networks are usually homogenous, which
might also result in more adequate job offers. Of course,
information about the educational requirements of jobs is
usually also transferred via formal channels. However, it
seems reasonable to assume that the information available
through networks is more detailed and more specific than
information received through formal channels.
With respect to wages, jobs that are offered through
the network should not be superior to the formal channel-
offer distribution. When members of a network transmit
information about jobs to a seeker, they are probably
not very well informed about the wage of the job nor do
they know a worker’s reservation wage. Wages are often
the result of negotiations between employer and
employee. However, the network is usually very well
informed about the qualification and education of a
worker, and it filters jobs in such a way that it offers
what it believes to be a good match. Hence, our expecta-
tion is that jobs do not differ in wages depending
on whether they were found with the help of the net-
work or not.
However, they differ in educational adequacy in such
a way that workers who found their job through the net-
work should have jobs that match their qualification
better. Note that our argument that jobs found through
the network have higher adequacy but no wage advant-
age implies that adequacy and wages are not positively
correlated (ceteris paribus, particularly human capital).
There is often a trade-off between initial wages when
entering the labour market and adequacy. However, this
counter-intuitive argument is in line with human capital
theory (Becker, 1964; see also Acemoglu and Pischke,
1999). Thus, jobs that offer general on-the-job training
should have relative low initial payment and steeper
earning profiles since employees have to compensate
employers for their training. Hence, the degree of gen-
eral training and job adequacy should be positively cor-
related. As will be shown below, the first implication
(the non-positive correlation between wages and ade-
quacy) can be tested with our data. However, we have no
data to test the second implication, that is, the positive
correlation between adequacy and general training.
The ISSP 2001
The ISSP 2001 was conducted on social relations and
support systems in 28 countries.3 Next to some socio-
demographic information (earnings, education, and
work experience), the surveys contain questions about
the number of respondents’ friends and how they found
their present jobs. Thus, participants were asked to
report the number of close friends at the work place and
in their neighbourhood, and other close friends. Fur-
thermore, they were asked ‘Please indicate how you first
found out about work at your present employer’. We
grouped the answers into strong ties if participants
named family members, other relatives, or close friends
as contacts. Answers were grouped into the category
weak ties if respondents said acquaintance. Table 1 dis-
plays the percentages of strong- and weak-network con-
tacts as well as the number of valid cases for the
participating nations of the ISSP 2001. Overall, we can
observe a substantial degree of variance. Proportions of
network contacts are comparatively high in the southern
European countries (Italy, Hungary, and Cyprus) as well
in some developing countries such as the Philippines
and Brazil. Relatively low proportions are observable in
the Scandinavian countries. The United States, Japan,
and Germany are in the middle. With few exceptions
(most eastern European countries) and contrary to
expectation, the proportion of strong-tie contacts is
Figure 1 Job offer distributions from networks and formal 
channels. Note: a refers to job adequacy.
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larger than that of weak-tie contacts. However, this
might be partly due to our coding of other relatives into
the strong-tie category. Nonetheless, the descriptive
impression presented in Table 1 confirms Granovetter’s
notion that on average a substantial amount of jobs are
found through network contacts.
Next we analyse whether network size and job place-
ment via social contacts are related to wages. Such analy-
ses are presented in Table 2. The first model is a standard
Mincer income OLS-regression model controlling for
country-specific differences by country dummies. In
order to compare the hourly incomes, we transformed
the national wages into purchasing power parity (PPP)
units. Since the transition from the original currencies
into PPP units can be done much more reliably for
OECD members, we restrict our analysis to these. Fur-
thermore, some countries (e.g. Austria, Norway) have
missing data with respect to some central variables
(income, education, or network indicators).
We had to drop both countries from our analysis so
that we end up with 15 remaining nations. The esti-
mated coefficient for education in model 1 of Table 2
tells us that every additional year in education is
rewarded on average by 7.9 per cent ((exp(0.076)–1) × 100)
increase in hourly wages. Also, the other results, the pos-
itive but concave effect for work experience, confirm the
well-known results of the standard income regressions.
Next, in model 2, we introduce the network indicators
and two dummy variables if respondents found their
jobs through strong or weak ties as compared with
formal methods (reference group). First, the more
friends respondents have at work and the more other
friends they report to have, the higher their hourly wage.
Thus, these results are in line with the hypothesis of
Montgomery (1992) that those with more contacts on
average expect more job offers, which raises their reserva-
tion wage and finally also their realized wage. Counter-
intuitive is the negative effect of the number of friends in
Table 1 Job placement via social networks
NA, not available.
Data source: ISSP 2001, own calculations.
Strong ties (%) Weak ties (%) All (%) N
Finland 16.47 9.30 25.77 1269
Austria 26.35 NA 26.35 850
Denmark 16.68 11.38 28.06 1151
Norway 17.36 10.98 28.34 1457
Australia 20.33 10.58 30.91 1087
Great Britain 22.69 8.37 31.06 824
New Zealand 20.65 10.43 31.08 930
Northern Ireland 22.34 10.15 32.49 1025
Germany 21.17 12.68 33.85 1167
Canada 24.29 11.99 36.28 984
France 26.64 10.71 37.35 1186
Switzerland 21.68 17.42 39.10 752
Japan 25.95 15.34 41.29 1102
Poland 19.21 24.90 44.11 1036
USA 30.83 13.46 44.29 1077
Latvia 21.06 25.00 46.06 940
Slovenia 31.66 14.99 46.65 894
Czech Republic 22.69 24.38 47.07 1124
Spain 33.77 14.04 47.81 1140
Israel 37.13 11.88 49.01 1061
Russia 27.71 22.62 50.33 1061
Italy 32.51 18.53 51.04 966
Hungary 22.94 29.94 52.88 1286
Cyprus 44.27 17.51 61.78 811
Brazil 55.21 12.36 67.57 1699
Chile 44.50 23.71 68.21 1164
Philippines 69.39 13.46 82.85 1039
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the neighbourhood. However, more wealthy people
might live further apart from each other in suburban
neighbourhoods, which may reduce their neighbourhood
contacts. The data also confirm the second part of Mont-
gomery’s (1992) argument, namely that respondents who
accepted a job offered via a strong tie have on average a
lower wage. This negative effect can also be observed for
weak ties confirming our extension of Montgomery’s
(1992) model. Thus, respondents who accepted an offer
through the network (weak or strong) either had a lower
search time or did not receive as many formal job offers.
Both causes lead to a lower number of total job offers,
which has the consequence of reducing the realized wage.
Finally, model 3 in Table 2 is a multilevel model in which
the country dummies are replaced by country-specific
covariates that should affect wages, such as GDP per cap-
ita, GDP growth, and the labour force participation of
women (LFB). All three coefficients are positive and sta-
tistically significantly related to wages. We also tested two
cross-level effects between GDP growth and placements
via strong and weak ties. Both interaction effects are not
significantly related to wages. Overall, the ISSP 2001 data
confirm former empirical findings (Mouw, 2003) that job
placement through social contacts is not positively associ-
ated with higher wages. Furthermore, our analysis of the
data confirms a hypothesis by Montgomery (1992) that
the size of the social network is positively related to wages.
The Swiss Graduate Survey
Our second data source is a survey of all Swiss university
graduates, which has been conducted biannually by the
Swiss statistical office since 1977. This data is collected from
university graduates one year after graduation via written
questionnaires and is concerned with respondents’
entrance (first job) into the labour market. We analyse the
newest available data of respondents who graduated in
2000.4 In this year, 12,447 graduates left the universities.
They were contacted about 12 months later via a written
questionnaire. A total of 8,151 graduates returned the ques-
tionnaire, constituting a response rate of 65 per cent.5
The data have some advantages that make them par-
ticularly suitable for an analysis of our propositions.
Table 2 Extended Mincer-type wage regressions
P-values in parentheses, computed with Huber–White-corrected standard errors.
*Significant at 0.05; **significant at 0.01.
~Under control of country dummies.
Models 1 and 2 are estimated by ordinary least squares, model 3 is estimated by maximum likelihood. In all three models, the following OECD countries are 
included: Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, 
and the United States.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Education 0.076** (0.000) 0.075** (0.000) 0.075** (0.000)
Experience 0.025** (0.000) 0.025** (0.000) 0.025** (0.000)
(Experience)2/100 −0.034** (0.000) −0.034** (0.000) −0.034** (0.000)
Sex (man = 1) 0.230** (0.000) 0.229** (0.000) 0.229** (0.000)
Marriage 0.127** (0.000) 0.129** (0.000) 0.129** (0.006)
Friends (other) 0.003** (0.001) 0.003* (0.022)
Friends (work) 0.012** (0.000) 0.012** (0.005)
Friends (neighbourhood) −0.007** (0.002) −0.007* (0.034)
Job (strong) −0.036* (0.028) −0.036* (0.017)
Job (weak) −0.036* (0.049) −0.037 (0.058)
GDP growth 95–01 0.162* (0.030)
GDP p.c. 0.052** (0.010)
LFP rate 0.051** (0.005)
Constant 1.178** (0.000) 1.179** (0.000) 0.846** (0.000)
Observations 7749 7749 7749
Adjusted R2 0.604 0.606
R2 level 1 0.311
R2 level 2 ~ ~ 0.078
Countries 15 15 15
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Since all respondents are labour market entrances, they are
at the start of their career, and the sample is homogeneous
with respect to their working biography. Many other
investigations into the effects of network contacts on job
characteristics, such as our own of the ISSP, use cross-
sectional data from the entire working population and
have to control for career-specific effects, such as the last
position before the present job was entered, the segment
of the labour market, the level of on-the-job training,
whether respondents changed employer, and so forth.
Such heterogeneity of individual working biographies
makes it more difficult to isolate the effect of network
contacts on the job in question. Also, Granovetter (1995:
154) discusses that past positions may have been found
by network contacts but not necessarily the present one.
However, since the past position influences the charac-
teristics of the present job, networks can have an indirect
effect on present positions. This indirect effect of net-
works is usually not taken into account so that the net-
work effect is underestimated.
Another advantage of our data is that the survey took
place 12 months or less (the median is 3 months) after
respondents entered the labour market. Hence, biases
due to memory problems that are usually present in ret-
rospective questioning should be less of a problem in
this data. Information about job searching can be inac-
curate in representative surveys that contain a cross-
section of the entire labour force for those respondents
who have not experienced a job shift for a longer time
period.
A further difficulty of analysing the effects of social
capital is the dependence of the labour market on eco-
nomic cycles. Granovetter (1995) supposes that strong
ties are more important during economic recessions
than weak ties because strong ties feel more obliged to
help their friends or relatives in difficult times. Another
possibility mentioned in Granovetter (1995) is that
employers have more bargaining power during economic
recessions than workers and may determine the job
match weakening the influence of networks. Theories of
labour market segmentation suggest that ‘social closure’
is stronger during recessive cycles, which would increase
the importance of personal contacts (Preisendörfer and
Voss, 1988). Some evidence of the dependence between
the economic situation and the shape of the labour mar-
ket was presented by Osberg (1993) with Canadian data.
He found that more unemployed used social networks
during times of higher unemployment. However, at the
same time, the proportion who found a job through the
network decreased, possibly because a larger proportion
of the network was also unemployed.
The results we present here concern the sample that
entered the labour market in the second half of 2000
(which was a prosperous economic year in Switzerland).
However, we also analysed the interviews from 1995, 1997,
and 1999 of graduates entering the labour market during
more recessive periods. We did not find substantial differ-
ences, which suggests that our results do not seem to
depend on the specific economic situation in 2000.
The survey contains information on respondents’
search strategies, search costs, labour market outcome,
and educational adequacy. Each of these variables is
measured by several indicators. The labour market out-
come is measured by wages and additionally by the occu-
pational position (with managing responsibilities as
opposed to without). Search costs are measured by the
search time, the number of job applications, and the
number of job interviews, and by a subjective measure of
how difficult respondents perceived the job search to
have been. Educational adequacy is measured by four
indicators, most importantly by the specificity of the
degree that the employer required. Additionally, the
questionnaire contains a few subjective measures, that is,
whether respondents believe that the job is a long-term
engagement, which offers career perspectives, the extent
to which respondents can use their ability, how they per-
ceive the possibility to exert influence, and how well the
wages correspond to their qualifications. Hence, the data
allow for an analysis of the effects of search strategies on
the labour market outcome, the search costs, and the
non-monetary job qualities.
For the analysis of wages, we restrict the analysis to
those graduates who received their first university degree
in 2000 and had entered the labour market by the time
of the interview.6 The questionnaire distinguishes 12 dif-
ferent job-search strategies: for example, graduates may
have applied directly, asked different employment agencies
(official employment office or one from the university),
responded to job advertisements in the media, or placed
an advertisement themselves. Graduates may also have
contacted friends, relatives, or colleagues or have looked
for jobs by asking professors and former employers they
know personally.
In 2001, 25.2 per cent of the graduates reported that
they received a job offer without prior search. The most
common job-search strategy among the graduates in
Switzerland is direct application (50.2 per cent) followed
by formal search strategies (46.9 per cent) and the help
of personal networks (40.5 per cent).7 More important
than the question which strategies were employed is the
question which ones were successful. Figure 2 shows that
about a quarter of the graduates found a job through
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each of the search channels, that is, formal, informal,
and direct applications. Moreover, these proportions
remain fairly constant over time. Comparing 1995 with
1999, the importance of social contacts decreased a little.
However, in 2001, the search via social networks was the
decisive route into the labour market for 19.6 per cent of
the graduates. Calculating the success ratio by dividing
the number of individuals who found a job by the
number who used a given strategy reveals no substantial
differences (direct application 44.8 per cent, formal
search 49.5 per cent, and social contacts 45.3 per cent).
Summarizing the first part of our descriptive analysis
again confirms Granovetter’s (1974, 1995) first hypothe-
sis. A substantial proportion of individuals find their
jobs due to the help of their personal networks. This res-
ult replicates that of studies conducted in the United
States (Young, 1974; Sagen et al., 1999).
The interesting question is whether job matches through
social networks are beneficial as compared with other
strategies. Table 3 shows the results of an OLS regression
of the logarithm of the hourly wages. Presented are the
effects of different search strategies controlling for other
mostly socio-demographic influences such as respond-
ents’ age, sex, or nationality. The analysis also controls for
the effects of different universities and subjects of study.
However, we do not show the latter effects to keep the
table readable. As is usual, wages for subjects such as
business administration or economics are higher than
the ones from social sciences, history, or language. Fur-
thermore, the highest wages are observed among gradu-
ates from universities in the German-speaking part as
compared with the French and Italian part, which
depends on the shape of the regional labour markets and
has little to do with the quality of the universities.8
First of all, the results reveal that searching is
rewarded. Respondents who searched for a job receive a
4 per cent wage bonus as compared with those who
accepted an offer by an employer without prior search
(see Table 3, model 1). However, wages do not increase
with increasing search time. This finding is not consist-
ent with job-search theory, which assumes that individ-
uals with a higher reservation wage should search longer
and realize a higher wage. However, job-search theory
makes the (highly unrealistic) assumption that job
searchers know the offer distribution (see Mortensen,
1986). The zero effect could be the result of the mixture
of two types of individuals in our sample: those who
search and find the better-paid jobs and those whose
reservation wage is higher than what the market is will-
ing to offer and who, therefore, have difficulties finding
a job that meets their reservation wage. More important
with respect to our hypothesis is the negative effect on
wages if the job was found with the help of social net-
works. Jobs that were found through social contacts pay
Figure 2 Proportion of successful search strategies, 1995–2001.
Notice: The question wording was: „Which of the strategies you used was decisive in 
finding the job?“.  
21.1 22.3 24.1 24.9
25.3 26.0 20.2 19.6
26.5 25.2
22.9 24.1
21.5 20.6 28.3 27.0
5.6 5.9 4.5 4.4
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
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1995 1997 1999 2001
formal search strategies search via social contacts
direct application received offer from employer
other
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on average 5 per cent less as compared with jobs found
through formal search channels. Thus, also our results
show that searching via social contacts has no monetary
advantage (Mouw, 2003) and, moreover, might even
have negative effects (see De Graaf and Flap, 1988; Flap
and Boxmann, 2001).9
Also, the number of different strategies people use to
find a job does not affect wages. This finding is also
inconsistent with job-search theory. A more intensive
search should increase the number of job offers, which
in turn should increase the chance of finding a better-
paid job. However, this again might be due to the mix-
ture of two groups of individuals, namely, those who
find well-paid jobs by searching and those whose
chances are worse to begin with and who are therefore
forced to use all channels.
In addition to the effects of search strategies, model 1
also controls for educational adequacy and certain
socio-demographic effects. First, as hypothesized, job
adequacy is negatively correlated with wages. Hence,
jobs for which the employer demands a specific degree
as compared with more general university degrees are on
average paid 5 per cent less. The results also show that
women have a 4 per cent wage disadvantage in the
labour market.10 Children increase the wage by 7 per
cent, which can be explained with social benefit pay-
ments employers have to make. A small positive effect of
2 per cent can also be observed for the graduates’ age
and a 3 per cent income advantage for work experience
acquired during university enrolment. The education of
a respondent’s father or mother does not affect a gradu-
ate’s wage level at labour market entrance. Hourly wages
are also not affected if respondents work only part-time
as compared with full-time.
In addition to wages, we also analysed the occupa-
tional position at which graduates entered the labour
market. The questionnaire contains a dichotomous variable
that indicates whether individuals received a position
with or without management responsibilities. Assuming
that management positions have more occupational
Table 3 The influence of social networks on hourly wages, occupational position, and educational adequacy
*Significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level.
Depicted in model 1 are the unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression. Numbers in parenthesis denote the standard errors of the estimates.
Model 1 is an OLS regression with the logarithm of hourly wages as the dependent variable. The model controls for university dummies and for subject dum-
mies, which are not displayed due to place restrictions. The university dummies consist of Basel, Berne, Fribourg, Geneva, Lausanne, Neuchâtel, St. Gallen, 
Ticino, ETH Zurich, EPF Lausanne with the University of Zurich as the reference. Subjects are distinguished into Theology, Language, History, Social Sciences, 
Law, Natural Science, Medicine, and technical subjects. Economics is used as the reference category.
Model 2 is a logistic regression. The dependent variable is coded as 1, if graduates received a job with management responsibilities, and 0 otherwise.
Model 3 is an ordered-probit model. The dependent variable is the educational adequacy coded as 1 if employer did not require any university degree, 2 with 
only a general university degree, 3 if a university degree from similar subjects were also accepted, and 4 if the employer required a specific degree.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Income regression Managing position Educational adequacy
Constant 3.30** (0.07) −5.91** (0.78) —
Search (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.04** (0.02) −0.14 (0.18) 0.16** (0.07)
Duration of search (in months) −0.001 (0.002) −0.01 (0.02) 0.004 (0.01)
Social network contact (0 = no, 1 = yes) −0.05** (0.01) −0.14 (0.15) 0.20** (0.06)
Direct application (0 = no, 1 = yes) −0.01 (0.01) −0.40** (0.15) 0.14** (0.05)
Number of different search strategies 
(if searched)
−0.003 (0.004) −0.04 (0.04) −0.07** (0.02)
Adequacy (0 = no specific degree, 
1 = specific degree)
−0.05** (0.01) — —
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) −0.04** (0.01) −0.14 (0.12) 0.03 (0.04)
Age (in years) 0.02** (0.002) 0.16** (0.02) −0.01 (0.01)
Nationality (0 = Swiss, 1 = non-Swiss) −0.001 (0.02) 0.32 (0.18) 0.05 (0.07)
Work experience (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.03** (0.01) 0.18 (0.11) 0.13** (0.05)
Children (0 = none, 1 = one or more) 0.07** (0.02) −0.11 (0.24) −0.02 (0.10)
Education of father (in years) −0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01)
Education of mother (in years) −0.003 (0.002) −0.001 (0.02) −0.03** (0.01)
Part-time employed (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.02 (0.01) −0.53** (0.13) 0.38** (0l.05)
N 3120 3556 3501
Adjusted R2/pseudo R2 0.15 0.07 0.10
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prestige, it is expected that offers from the network
should lead to management positions more often. Since
we deal with a dichotomous variable, model 2 in Table 3
shows the logistic-regression coefficients. However, only
direct applications lead to jobs that start in a managing
position significantly less often. Apart from this, two
further significant effects emerge from the model: man-
aging positions are more often obtained by older gradu-
ates and less often open for part-time employment.
Thus, model 2 in Table 3 echoes the results obtained for
the wages regression.
Finally, in model 3 in Table 3, we attend to the ques-
tion whether network contacts increase the probability
of receiving a job with higher educational adequacy.
Graduates were asked whether their current employer
required no university degree at all, only a general degree,
one from a related subject, or a specific university degree.
We assume that jobs that do not require a university
degree or only an unspecific one are less adequate for
graduates and less preferred by them. Since the depend-
ent variable has four categories that can be ordered,
model 3 in Table 3 presents the results of an ordered-
probit model. The results suggest that search strategies
matter. Respondents who searched (coefficient of 0.16),
received a job through social networks (coefficient of
0.20), or applied directly (coefficient of 0.14) report to
have jobs that more often required an adequate degree
as compared with respondents who found jobs through
formal search channels.11 This result confirms our
hypothesis that friends, relatives, and colleagues seem to
pay attention to a graduate’s educational qualifications
when informing about job opportunities.
The adequacy of jobs that were found through social
networks is also better in the respondents’ own percep-
tion. The participants of the survey were asked whether
they view their current job as a temporary means to earn
money or as a long-term career investment, as well as
how well they are able to exert influence and apply their
abilities on the job. Clearly, jobs that are more adequate
to individuals’ interest and education should be viewed
more often as long-term investments and should offer
better opportunities for personal influence and ability.
The results of the analysis are displayed in Table 4. The
logistic regression (model 1 in Table 4) shows that grad-
uates who found their job through the network (as well
as direct applicants) have a higher chance of finding jobs
with a long-term career perspective (the odds increase
by exp(0.43) = 1.54). Models 2 and 3 contain the results
of exerting influence and using their abilities at the work
place. In both models, the non-standardized OLS-regression
coefficients are significantly positive (0.17 and 0.07 on a
0.05 and 0.10 significance level), indicating that jobs
found via the network are perceived to offer more
opportunities for personal influence and ability.12
Network jobs, however, are negatively associated with
the perceived adequacy of payment (model 4 in Table 4).
Thus, this finding corresponds rather well to the com-
paratively lower hourly wages reported in Table 3. Also,
noteworthy are the positive effects of the work experi-
ence graduates acquired during their study. Graduates
who worked while still enrolled at the university have a
better chance of finding a job that is related to their sub-
ject of study. Obviously, this work experience also
increases graduates’ knowledge of where to find ade-
quate jobs.
Finally, we will take a look at the search costs. If
Granovetter’s (1974, 1995) and our models are correct,
graduates who use networks for job searching should
receive job offers more often and sooner. Thus, the
search time should be reduced for all those who use their
networks. This hypothesis is supported by our analysis
of the search time. We analysed the search time until
respondents found a job by event-history analysis (more
particularly we use a Weibull model), which takes right-
censored cases (respondents who were still looking for a
job at the time of the interview) into account. Model 1 in
Table 5 shows the effects on the hazard rate of leaving
the stage of search and entering employment. Thus,
graduates using the network have an increased hazard
rate of 17 per cent ((exp(0.16)–1) × 100) as opposed to
those who use formal job-search strategies. Moreover,
we analysed two more indicators of the search costs,
namely, the number of applications and the number of
job interviews individuals went through before accept-
ing a job. Since these variables are count data, we analyse
them using negative-binomial models (see Cameron and
Trivedi, 1998).13 The estimation results suggest that
graduates who used the network wrote 11 per cent fewer
applications and went through 11 per cent fewer job
interviews. Thus, models 2 and 3 confirm the results we
obtained through our analysis of the search time.
Our fourth model (in Table 5) contains the analysis of
respondents’ perception whether they encountered diffi-
culty during the job search. This indicator also reflects
the results we already obtained from models 1 through 3
of Table 5. Respondents who used the network have a
lower chance (the odds are reduced by 0.66) to report
difficulties. Models 1 through 4 in Table 5 also control
for a number of socio-demographic effects that are pos-
sibly associated with the search costs. A few systematic
and crucial results emerge from the control variables. Thus,
women and academics who are looking for part-time
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employment seem to encounter higher search costs. Obvi-
ously, the number of search strategies respondents used
increases the number of applications and job interviews.
Summary and Discussion
This article tries to demonstrate that social networks
matter for finding a job. First, we test some implications
of Granovetter’s (1974, 1995) and Montgomery’s (1992)
hypotheses by analysing the ISSP 2001 data. Three basic
findings emerge from this analysis. First, a substantial
proportion of individuals report that they found their
job through network contacts. Second, individuals with
a larger number of friends (particularly friends at the
work place) indeed report to have a higher income. The
effect can be explained by Montgomery’s (1992)
assumption that a larger network increases respondents’
reservation wage and consequentially their income.
Third, however, jobs that are directly found with the
help of a network tie are not better paid. This result,
which may at first seem counter-intuitive, might stem
from the fact that those who accepted an offer through
network contacts could have overall received less offers
or, alternatively, had a shorter search time, which conse-
quentially results in a lower realized wage.
Furthermore, we extended Montgomery’s (1992)
model by assuming that the distribution of job offers
from networks is superior to the distribution of job
offers due to formal channels with respect to educational
adequacy. We tested our hypotheses by using the Swiss
Graduate Survey. Overall, four results emerge from this
analysis: First, also in this survey, a substantial propor-
tion of individuals report that they found their first job
by network contacts. Second, we analysed the hourly
wages and were not able to discover a wage bonus for
individuals who had accepted an offer through the net-
work. More specifically, controlling for the search time
those who accepted an offer through the network had
even a monetary disadvantage. Thus, our analysis con-
firms other findings (De Graaf and Flap, 1988; Flap and
Boxmann, 2001).
Table 4 Social networks and subjective indicators of job adequacy
†Significant at the 10% level; *significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level.
Numbers in parenthesis denote the standard errors. The regressions contain but do not show dummies for universities and dummies for the subject of study.
Model 1 is a logistic regression. The dependent variable is coded with 1 = long-term employment intention with possibility of upward mobility and 0 = short-
term employment with no upward mobility.
Model 2 is an OLS regression. The dependent variable measures respondents’ rating of the adequacy of job concerning the possibility of using their knowledge 
and ability.
Model 3 is an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the perceived adequacy concerning the possibility of having an impact on the job.
Model 4 is an OLS regression; the dependent variable contains the rating of the perceived adequacy of payment. Same results were obtained for models 2 
through 4 if an ordered-probit was applied instead of an OLS regression.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Career investment Apply ability Exert influence Perceived payment
Constant 3.04** (0.97) 2.46** (0.21) 2.72** (0.22) 2.36** (0.26)
Search (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.33 (0.22) 0.03 (0.05) −0.04 (0.05) 0.18** (0.06)
Search duration (in months) −0.01** (0.003) −0.001 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) −0.01 (0.01)
Social contacts (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.43** (0.17) 0.17** (0.04) 0.07† (0.04) −0.16** (0.05)
Direct application (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.57** (0.19) 0.10** (0.04) −0.06 (0.04) −0.02 (0.04)
Number of search strategies −0.19** (0.04) −0.05** (0.01) −0.04** (0.01) −0.01 (0.01)
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 0.04 (0.14) −0.01 (0.03) −0.02 (0.03) 0.04 (0.04)
Age (in years) −0.004 (0.03) −0.001 (0.01) −0.02* (0.01) −0.01 (0.01)
Nationality (0 = Swiss, non-Swiss = 1) 0.59* (0.29) 0.04 (0.05) −0.07 (0.05) 0.01 (0.06)
Work experience (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.18 (0.15) 0.11** (0.03) 0.10** (0.03) 0.09* (0.04)
Children (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.27 (0.31) 0.05 (0.06) 0.03 (0.07) 0.25** (0.08)
Education of father (in years) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Education of mother (in years) −0.04 (0.03) 0.00 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Part-time employed (0 = no, 1 = yes) −0.54** (0.14) 0.07* (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) −0.24** (0.04)
N 3513 3557 3522 3527
Pseudo R2/adjusted R2 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.05
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Third, our results suggest that jobs found with the
help of friends, colleagues, or relatives have a higher
educational adequacy. Thus, employers more often
require a specific university degree for jobs that are
found by network contacts. Moreover, respondents
more often view jobs found over the network as long-
term engagements compatible with their career plans
versus short-term employment that has little or no rela-
tion to career plans. The notion that educational job
adequacy is higher is also supported by respondents’
evaluation of job characteristics. Thus, network jobs are
more often perceived as offering the opportunity to
exert influence and apply ability.
Fourth, the analyses show that searching via the net-
work saves search costs. Hence, respondents who found
their job through the network did so faster, applied less
often, and went through a lower number of job inter-
views. Therefore, searching via the network has some
monetary benefits regarding individual’s lifetime earn-
ings. However, these benefits are small (on average
search time is about two weeks shorter) given an indi-
vidual’s lifetime of work.
As discussed above, labour market outcomes may
depend on the business cycle. Some research suggests
that networks become more important during reces-
sions since the market is more closed towards new
entrances. Other results suggest that the influence of net-
works should decrease, since during recessions a larger
proportion of an individual’s network should be unem-
ployed as well. In order to exclude the possibility that
our results depend on the good health of the economy in
2000, we also analysed the data of graduates who entered
the job market during recessive times in 1995, 1997, and
1999. However, we obtained almost identical results
from the other three data sets as well.
To summarize, the acceptance of a job offer through
the network seems to have non-monetary advantages for
labour market entrances. The help of the network
increases the chance of an appropriate match concern-
ing respondents’ education and the type of work. At the
same time, our results replicate that finding a job
through the network has no monetary benefit. Thus, the
results support Montgomery’s (1992) model as well as
our extension of it that the distribution of job offers
from the network is stochastically dominant with respect
to educational adequacy. Our results also suggest that
graduates face a trade-off between adequacy and wages.
Higher adequacy is associated with lower entrance
wages. Employers who look for specific university
degrees seem to provide general on-the-job training
more often, which is associated with a steeper wage–age
profile.
Table 5 Search strategies and the cost of job search
†Significant at the 10% level; *significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level.
Numbers in brackets denote the standard errors. The regressions contain but do not show dummies for universities and dummies for the subject of study.
Model 1 is a Weibull model of the hazard rate to enter employment.
Models 2 and 3 are negative-binomial models with the number of applications and the number of job interviews as dependent variables.
Model 4 is a logistic regression analysis, the dependent variable indicating whether respondents report difficulties in finding a job.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Duration of 
search
Number of 
applications
Number of job 
interviews
Difficulties in 
job search
Constant 0.45 (0.28) 0.66** (0.24) 0.37 (0.26) −4.29** (0.84)
Social contacts (0/1) 0.16** (0.04) −0.11** (0.04) −0.11** (0.05) −0.42** (0.14)
Direct application (0/1) 0.02 (0.04) 0.70** (0.04) 0.44** (0.04) 0.03 (0.15)
Number of strategies −0.18** (0.01) 0.53** (0.01) 0.41** (0.01) 0.82** (0.04)
Gender (0/1) 0.02 (0.04) 0.10** (0.04) −0.18** (0.04) 0.38** (0.13)
Age (in years) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.03)
Nationality (0/1) −0.06 (0.06) 0.02 (0.06) 0.01 (0.06) 0.21 (0.20)
Work experience (0/1) 0.03 (0.04) −0.07* (0.04) −0.13** (0.04) −0.25† (0.14)
Children (0/1) −0.07 (0.07) 0.05 (0.07) −0.20** (0.08) 0.33 (0.23)
Education of father 0.001 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02)
Education of mother 0.0021 (0.01) −0.02* (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.06* (0.03)
Part-time employed (0/1) −0.27** (0.04) −0.12** (0.04) −0.02** (0.04) 0.26* (0.13)
N 3511 3819 3834 3801
Chi-square/pseudo R2 433.81 0.09 0.09 0.26
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Both of our data sources have particular advantages
but also some disadvantages. Thus, our analysis of the
Graduate Survey does not allow for a test of the weak-tie
versus strong-tie hypothesis. The Graduate Survey has
no information concerning what type of contacts are best
with respect to finding adequate jobs. Furthermore, it
contains no information on the size or other features of
individuals’ networks. We can also not exclude the pos-
sibility that individuals using the network for their job
search have some unobserved characteristics that deter-
mine the outcome of the search instead of the used
search strategy. However, the data at hand do not support
this possibility. Thus, none of the graduates reported to
have only used a single strategy, and estimating one’s
chance to use the network was only significantly related
to the number of strategies used, as well as to gender
(men use networks more often than women). However,
overall the McFadden R2 of a probit model was too low
(0.04) to corroborate the obtained estimate into a treat-
ment-effect model (Greene, 2000: 933). Thus, clarification
of the problem of possible unobserved heterogeneity as
well as the question to which extent the results can be
generalized to a larger proportion of the labour market
has to be left to further research. However, we believe that
the analyses presented here draw attention to the non-
monetary benefit of social networks on the labour market.
Notes
1. Most of the people interviewed did have a university
degree.
2. Note that Mouw (2003) calls this ‘spurious social
capital’. This term implies that it cannot be inter-
preted causally. However, the argument via the res-
ervation wage implies a causal explanation. It does
not need to be either the one or the other but may
well be a mixture of a spurious relation and a causal
effect via wage expectations. Networks could also
increase the reservation wage by increasing the value
of leisure.
3. The data are available from the Swiss Information
and Data Archive Services for the Social Sciences
(SIDOS) in Neuchâtel (http://www.sidos.ch).
4. Switzerland has 12 universities, 6 in the German-
speaking part (Universities of Basel, Berne, St. Gallen,
Lucerne, Zurich, and the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology in Zurich), 5 in the French-speaking
part (Universities of Fribourg, Geneva, Lausanne,
Neuchâtel, and the Swiss Federal Institute of Tech-
nology in Lausanne), and 1 in the Italian-speaking
part (University of Ticino).
5. The data are available from the Swiss Statistical
Office in Neuchâtel, Switzerland (http://
www.admin.bfs.ch).
6. This excludes graduates who received a second
degree (e.g. a dissertation) and those 4.1 per cent
graduates who were still looking for a job at the time
of the interviews in Spring 2001.
7. These proportions correspond closely to those
reported by Young (1974), which are based on a sur-
vey of 750,000 university graduates in the United
States. For a similar result concerning direct applica-
tion, see also Ports (1993).
8. The detailed results of universities and subjects’
hourly wages can be obtained from the authors.
9. Note that the estimated effect of the use of social
networks on wage might be biased if those who
found their jobs via social networks are different in
some characteristics not controlled for in the regres-
sion equation from individuals who did not use
social contacts. One possible procedure to correct
for this possible bias is the estimation of a switching
regression model (Wooldridge, 2002). However, in
our case, the estimation of the selection equation
(probit model) did not show any fundamental dif-
ferences between the two groups. The detailed
results can be obtained from the authors.
10. If women have a lower labour market participation
than men, the analysis needs a correction (Heckit
corrections; Heckman, 1979) to obtain an unbiased
estimator. However, female participation in our
sample is about 90 per cent, so that such a correction
is of lesser concern here.
11. The calculation of the exact change in probabilities
would require further transformations of the coeffi-
cient, which we do not report here.
12. The extent to which respondents believe that they
can apply their ability or exert influence on the job
was measured on a four-point-rating scale varying
from very much to not at all. Our OLS regression
assumes interval measurement. However, the results
remain robust even if we apply ordered-probit mod-
els to those variables as well.
13. Usually count data require the analysis via Poisson
regressions. In our case, the so-called assumption of
equidispersion is not fulfilled so that we apply the
negative-binomial model. The assumption of equid-
ispersion is fulfilled if a = Var(y|x)/E(y|x) does not
significantly deviate from 1. In model 2 a = 1.5 and
in model 3 a = 1.2 indicating over-dispersion.
However, the estimation results do not differ sub-
stantially between the Poisson model and the
negative-binomial model used here.
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Appendix 1
Table A1 Measurement of variables, means, and proportions of the Swiss Graduate Survey
Minimum Maximum Mean
Job found via social network 0 1 0.20
Search for a job 0 1 0.75
Job found via direct application 0 1 0.24
Number of used search strategies 0 10 2.15
University of Basel 0 1 0.07
University of Berne 0 1 0.12
University of Fribourg 0 1 0.07
University of Geneva 0 1 0.11
University of Lausanne 0 1 0.09
University of Neuchâtel 0 1 0.04
University of St. Gallen 0 1 0.05
University of Ticino 0 1 0.01
Swiss Institute of Technology in Zurich 0 1 0.17
Swiss Institute of Technology in Lausanne 0 1 0.06
University of Zurich 0 1 0.21
Theology 0 1 0.01
Language 0 1 0.11
History 0 1 0.09
Social Sciences 0 1 0.15
Other subjects of study 0 1 0.03
Law 0 1 0.08
Natural Science 0 1 0.12
Medicine 0 1 0.08
Technical subjects 0 1 0.15
Economics 0 1 0.18
Gender (1 = female) 0 1 0.45
Age (in years) 22 55 28.57
Nationality (1 = foreigner) 0 1 0.08
Work participation during study 0 1 0.28
Children (1 = yes) 0 1 0.08
Education of father 9 17.5 13.18
Education of mother 9 17.5 11.55
Part-time employed 0 1 0.36
Search duration (in months) 0 18 2.68
Position with managing responsibilities 0 1 0.17
Adequacy of university degree concerning job 1 4 2.86
Long-term employment vs. short-term job 0 1 0.89
Opportunity to apply abilities 0 3 2.30
Opportunity to exert influence 0 3 2.19
continued
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Table A1 (continued)
The category History also includes Philosophy, Archaeology, History of Art, Ethnology, Music, Theatre, and Film. Social Sci-
ences include Psychology, Pedagogic, Sociology, Social Work, Political Science, and Media Science. Other subjects include Ecol-
ogy, Sport, and Military Science. Natural Sciences include Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Computer Science, Geography, 
Chemistry, and Biology. Economics also includes Business Administration.
Minimum Maximum Mean
Perception of payment 0 3 2.00
Number of applications 0 50 8.54
Number of job interviews 0 40 2.84
Perception of difficulties during the search 0 1 0.16
Logarithm of hourly wage  2.82 4.38 3.68
